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COMMENTSand parol evidence was properly rejected. Farrell v. Mentzer"
which is relied on as an exposition of the law of constructive trusts
arose when the plaintiff, being about to bid for the property at
a trustee's sale, orally agreed that one Wright was to bid for the
property. Wright was then to transfer the property so purchased
to the defendant, who was in turn to convey one-half to the plaintiff upon being reimbursed. The defendant received the property
as had been planned, but refused to convey to the plaintiff. The
supreme court held that parol evidence of the agreement to convey
to the plaintiff would violate the Statute of Frauds. Clearly in this
case it would, for the contract itself tried to bind an interest in
the land. Cases of agreements to purchase at a judicial sale and
either hold in trust or convey later are clearly distinguishable
because the Statute of Frauds bars proof of either the contract or
the express trust.38 Farrelv. Mentzer is a sound case and authority
of the strongest sort on the law of constructive trusts in Washington, but factually it is not controlling in the Carkonen case.
It may be said that the Carkonen case has this very decided
effect upon- so much of the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds
as is set forth in REm. RE;v. STAT. § 10550. The court has declared
that the oral employment of an agent to purchase land does affect
an interest in the land, and thus the employment is within the
statute. In this position the court is well supported by other decisions."9 It is arguable, however, that this holding is inconsistent
with the Washington cases which say that an oral agreement to
form a partnership to deal in land is not within the statute. 40
It is apparent, then, that the present stand of the court, on this
point is sound, and on the construction of the statute requiring the
agreement employing the broker to be in writing is also supported
by good authority, if not entirely consistent with certain previous pronouncements on the subject. Accepting the premises of
the court., there can be no quarrel with the decision.
HARDYN

B. SOULE.

STATUTORY LIMITATION OF INNKEEPERIS' LIABILITY
Many of the earliest cases of which reports are extant deal
with the liability of the innkeeper to his guest, and the earliest
known Roman law gave an action against the innkeeper if the
baggage of the guest was in any way damaged, lost or stolen.' At
common law the innkeeper was the insurer of the baggage of his
guest. He was under an absolute liability unless he could prove
that the loss was caused by an Act of God, the public enemy, by
the act of the guest or of the guest's servants.2 This absolute
=102 Wash. 629, 174 Pac. 482 (1918).
"More than an agency is involved in such cases. 3 BoGER , TRuSTS AND
TRUSTEES (1st ed. 1935) § 1571.
"OSee note 23, supra.
"See note 29, supra.
'WHARTON, INNxEEPEms (lst ed., 1876) 88.
'This rule was first laid down in Y. B. 10 Henry VII, p. 26 (1495), and

has been reiterated from time to time by practically all courts down to the
present.
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liability was extended to include all movable goods, and even those
goods upon which a felony could not be committed.' The Washington Court has fully approved of this common law rule and
has applied it strictly.'
This stringent rule of the common law developed through necessity. There being many ruffians and robbers abroad at night
throughout the land, the wayfarer had to put up at an inn or
else likely suffer the loss of all his goods and possibly his life.
Often the innkeeper was sorely tempted to cast his lot with that
of the highwayman, with the natural result that the traveler could
never feel secure.5 This led to the common law placing an absolute
liability upon the innkeeper, thus taking all the profits out of such
conspiracy with the highwayman.
With the advance of civilization, improved means of transportation and competitive hotels or inns, the traveler was no longer
forced to rely upon a single inn, except in isolated cases-but
could more often make his choice. Discounting the possibility of
conspiracy among innkeepers, the necessity for stringent regulation by law became less and less, with the result that the innkeeper
has gradually escaped from the rigid rule of the common law
by means of various statutory changes.'
One of the first statutory invasions was to limit liability to those
cases wherein the innkeeper had been negligent. At common law
lack of negligence could not be pleaded as a defense, and in fact
the innkeeper was liable even though he had used the greatest of
care and the goods had been forcefully taken from him by robbers.7
Another means used to avoid stringent liability was the attempt
to have the courts declare that some goods which the traveler carried with him could not be considered as baggage. At common law
the liability of carriers was limited to whatever baggage was required for the personal needs and convenience of the passenger,
either for his immediate needs, according to his station in life, or
to the ultimate purpose of his journey.' Some courts, by analogy,
applied this rule to innkeepers, although on a somewhat broader
basis.' The majority of courts, however, have refused to limit
the liability to goods reasonably required in traveling,0 since the
attempts of the courts to limit liability by the classification of
'Calye's Case, 8 Co. 32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 520 (1585) is cited as the leading
case upon the common law liability of innkeepers. The court said:
"Although the guest does not deliver his goods to the innkeeper to keep,
nor acquaint him with them; yet if they be carried away or stolen, the
innkeeper is liable, except for theft caused by the servant of the guest."
'Watt v. Kilbury, 53 Wash. 446, 102 Pac. 403 (1909); Featherstone v.
Dessert, 173 Wash. 264, 22 P. (2d) 1050 (1933).
5EDWARDS, BAILMENTS (1st ed. 1855) 403.
'For an early case discussing the reason for the relaxation of the rule see
Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172, 189 (1870).
7EDWARDS, BAILMENTS (2d ed. 1878) § 463.
Macrow v. Great Western Ry., L. R. 6 Q. B. 612 (1871).
9Wilkins v. Earle, 44 N. Y. 172 (1870).
0
' Berkshire Woolen Co. v. Proctor, 7 Cush. 417 (Mass. 1851); Pinkerton
v. Woodward, 33 Cal. 557 (1867).
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baggage merely led to confusion, and in some cases to ridicule.:"
The tendency of modern legislation is to divide baggage into
two classes. 12 Into the first falls money, jewels, securities and other
valuables of small comlpass, but of large value, which may easily
be deposited in the innkeeper's safe for safe-keeping.' s As to this
class of baggage the statutes generally provide that the innkeeper
is under an absolute liability only in case such goods are deposited
in the safe. The amount which the innkeeper is required to accept
is also limited by statute. The second class of goods is that baggage
of a bulky nature which, of necessity, must be kept in the room
of the guest.' 4 Most statutes disregard any distinctions as to what
constitutes baggage in this class, but rather limit the innkeeper's
liability to certain specified amounts. In this class the innkeeper
is only liable if negligent, but the fact of loss is prima facie evidence of negligence. 5
In line with this policy, Washington, in 1890, passed its first
statute in regard to the liability of innkeepers.' 6 This statute provided that when an innkeeper made available a suitable safe, he
could require his guests to deposit money, banknotes, jewelry,
articles of gold and silver manufacture, precious stones and bullion
in the safe, and if such goods were not so deposited the innkeeper
would be saved from liability.
In 1915 the legislature passed the first statute actually limiting
the amount of liability of the innkeeper. 7 It provided that, as
before, certain articles should be deposited in the hotel safe, but
also provided that the innkeeper should not be required to accept
for deposit goods valued at more than $1000.00 and limited his
liability to that amount, except in those cases of special contract
between the innkeeper and his guest. The act expressly provided:
"Hotelkeeper shall be liable for any ross of the above
enumerated articles... if caused by the theft or negligence
of the hotelkeeper or his servants." (Italics ours.)
The act further provided for limitations as to the amount of
liability for baggage left in the rooms, determined by the size of
the hotel, amount paid for services and other factors.'8
'The early cases variously held that baggage did not include certain
special items: Myers v. Cottrill, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,985 (E. D. Wis. 1873)
(samples of commercial travelers); Pettigrew v. Barnum, 11 Md. 434, .69
Am. Dec. 212 (1857) (merchandise and silver tableware); Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126 (1859) (pistols).
2214 R.C. L. 529.
'N. Y. Laws 1855, c. 421 amended N. Y. Laws 1897, c. 305; PIRCE'S CODE
(1933) § 2805.
"PMCE'S CODE (1933) § 2806.
'6The basis for modern legislation may be found in Calye's Case, 8 Co.
32a, 77 Eng. Rep. 520 (1585), cited supra note 3, in which we find the following statement: "The innkeeper requires his guest to put his goods in
such a chamber under lock and key, and then he will warrant them, and
otherwise not." See also Bean v. Ford, 65 Misc. Rep. 481, 119 N. Y. S. 1074
(1909).
"2Wash.Laws 1889, p. 95, 1 iIn's CODE (1891) § 2712, PEcE's CODE (1902)
§ 5586.
1Wash. Laws 1915, c. 190 § 3, P cE's CODE (1919) § 2806.
"It is interesting to note that the Act of 1889, Wash. Laws 1889, p. 95,
cited supra note 16, was not repealed by the Act of 1915, Wash. Laws 1915,
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Minor changes in the Act of 1915 were enacted in 1919, and
finally in 1933 the law was re-enacted with several important
changes. The class of goods required to be deposited in the hotel
safe was expanded to include: money, banknotes, jewelry, precious
stones and ornaments, railway mileage books or tickets, negotiable
securities or other valuable papers, bullion, or property of small
compass. The $1000.00 limitation still remained. Thus, the innkeeper was not required to accept anything worth more than
$1000.00 nor was he required to accept goods of unusual or large
bulk. The significant feature of the Act of 1933, however, lies in
the fact that the final clause of the previous acts, which expressly
removed the limitation of liability in case of the negligence of the
innkeeper or his servants, was here omitted, and in its place the
following clause was substituted:
"Provided, however, that in case of such deposit of such
property, the proprietor ...shall in no event be liable for
loss or destruction thereof, or damage thereto, unless
caused by the theft or gross negligence of such proprietor
...or his employees."
All courts have uniformly held that statutes limiting the common law liability must be strictly construed. All courts of other
states have at all times and the courts of this state have heretofor
held that the statutory limitation of liability for goods deposited
in the safe would not apply where the loss was occasioned through
the negligence or the theft by the innkeeper or his servants.19
The Act of 1933 has been strictly construed by the Supreme
Court of this state in the recent case of Goodwin v. Georgian Hotel
Co.20 and has thus brought in a new phase of innkeeper's liability.
In that case the plaintiff, a guest in defendant's hotel, deposited
an envelope containing $1500 in the hotel safe for safe-keeping,
taking a receipt therefor, but without special agreement as to the
amount of the innkeeper's liability. When the plaintiff presented
his claim check, the envelope and the money could not be found.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff was guilty of fraud (that he had
previously reclaimed the money), but that in any case it was not
liable for more than the statutory limitation of $1000, having
posted the proper statutory notices to guests. Plaintiff claimed
that the innkeeper had failed to show a lack of negligence and that

c. 190 § 3, nor are any records to be found which indicate that it has ever
been repealed by the legislature or otherwise disposed of, although the
Act of 1889 has not been carried forward by the various code writers.
"'Watt v. Kilbury, 53 Wash. 446, 102 Pac. 403 (1909); Featherstone v.
Dessert, 173 Wash. 264, 22 P. (2d) 1050 (1933); Gillett v. Waldorf Hotel Co.,
136 Wash. 615, 241 Pac. 14 (1925); Johnston v. Mobile Hotel, - Ala. -, 167
So. 595 (1936); Jones v. Savannah Hotel Co., 141 Ga. 530, 81 S. E. 874 (1914);
Rockhill v. Congress Hotel Co., 237 Ill.
98, 86 N. E. 740 (1908); Edwards
House v. Davis, 124 Miss. 485, 86 So. 849 (1921); Leon v. Kitchen Bros.
Hotel Co., - Neb. -, 277 N. W. 823 (1938); Millhiser v. Beau Site Co.,
251 N. Y. 290, 167 N. E. 447 (1929); Dallas Hotel Co. v. Davison, 23 S. W.
(2d) 708 (Tex. 1930).
2097 Wash. Dec. 150, 84 P. (2d) 681 (1938).
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hence the limitation did not apply. Held: The burden of proof
rests upon the innkeeper to show a lack of negligence, and here
the defendant failed to sustain the burden and was guilty of negligence, but that the "one-thousand-dollar limitation applies to
losses caused by the theft of an employee or by the gross negligence
of the hotelkeeper or his, or its, employees."
The court also held that the only time the statutory limitation
would not apply would be in case of actual theft or embezzlement
by the innkeeper himself, whether individual or corporate, basing
this last upon the contention that the legislature could not have
intended the limitation to apply in such cases.
Originally the statutory limitation of liability was designed to
relieve the innkeeper from too heavy a burden caused .by losses
entirely beyond his control. In effect the statute allowed the innkeeper to say to the guest, "I will not be liable for the loss of
certain properties for any cause whatsoever, unless such properties
are deposited in my safe for safekeeping." In part the Act of 1933
reads:
"... if guests . . . neglect to deliver such property ...
for deposit in the safe or vault, the proprietor ... shall not
be liable for any loss . . . sustained by such guests .. .
by negligence of such proprietor ...or his ... employees,
or by fire, theft, burglary, or any other cause whatsoever."
Conversely, then, it would seem that the innkeeper would be liable
for such loss if the goods were properly deposited, regardless of the
reason for the loss, but the statute continues in this manner:
".... and if such guests deposit such property . .. proprietor ... shall not be liable for the loss ... exceeding
... one thousand dollars, notwithstanding said property
may be of greater value, unless by special arrangement in
writing with such proprietor . . . Provided, however,
that in case of such deposit of such property, the proprietor ... shall in no event be liable for loss ... unless
caused by the theft or gross negligence of such proprietor,
or his.., agents, servants or employees."
This clearly indicates that the innkeeper is to be held only for
the statutory limit, and it seems apparent that the innkeeper shall
not be liable in any case in which gross negligeince has not been
shown. The saving feature is that the burden of proof is upon the
innkeeper to show a lack of negligence, the court, in the Goodwin
case, saying:
".. . in many cases ... it would be well-nigh impossible
for him (the guest) ever to prove theft by, or gross negligence on the part of, those connected with the hotel. We,
therefore, hold, as we have in former cases, that, when the
guest of an hotel proves that he has deposited money or
other valuables for safekeeping with the hotel and they
have not been returned to him on demand, he has made
a prima facie case of liability and the burden is then upon
the hotelkeeper to come forward with evidence to show
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that the loss or destruction, if any, was not caused by the
21
gross negligence of, or theft by, himself or employees."
It is submitted that the Washington Supreme Court, in the
Goodwin case correctly interpreted the statute in its true meaning.
However, the legislature, by the Act of 1933, placed the State of
Washington in a unique position as regards the liability of innkeepers. It is doubtful whether the legislature wished to or intended to take such an extreme turn from the common law as is
taken in the Act of 1933. Under the normal statute few cases ever
reached the courts because the statute clearly set forth the liabilities of the innkeeper and he knew that in certain cases he had to
pay. On the other hand under the Act of 1933, an interpreted by
the court, there is grave possibility of increased litigation, for the
innkeeper may now hide behind
the statute to avoid the conse22
quences of his own negligence.
GEORGE 14. 'MARTIN.

JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE LAW OF SISTER STATES
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A year ago in the case of State v. Johnson1 the court approved
the admission in evidence of certified photostatic copies of fingerprint records from penitentiaries of Oregon and California to prove
the identity of the defendant as a prior inmate of those institutions. The court relied on a federal statute2 which, under authority
of Article IV, § 1, of the Federal Constitution, 3 sets forth the procedure for certification of records that was followed in that case.
The statute further provides that when such procedure shall have
been followed,
"the said records and exemplifications, so authenticated,
shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court and office within the United States as they have by
law or usage in the courts or offices of the state, territory,
or country, as aforesaid, from which they are taken."
It therefore became necessary for the court to investigate the
"See Watt v. Kilbury, 53 Wash. 446, 102 Pac. 403 (1909); Gillett v.

Waldorf Hotel Co., 136 Wash. 615, 241 Pac. 14 (1925); Davis v. Cohen, 253
Mich. 330, 235 N. W. 173 (1931).
'In handing down the decision in the Georgian Hotel case the court
pointed out with approval a statement of the New York Court of Appeals
in the case of Milhiser v. Beau Site Co., in which that court reversed a
lower court decision interpreting the New York statute in the same manner
as the Washington statute has been interpreted, and in which the court
said: "Such a holding by this court would nullify the purpose of the statute
and be in conflict with the spirit and intent thereof." The Washington
statute is copied from the New York statute of 1897, and, with the exception of the final clause in the act, follows the present New York law very
closely.
1194 Wash. 438, 78 P. (2d) 561 (1938).
IREv. STAT. § 906 (1875), 28 U. S. C. 688 (1934).

"'Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress
may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records,
and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."

